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Abstract - An unlocked Electronic Product Code (EPC) tag 
allows for issuance of most commands without the need for 
any authorization. This means that a system with unlocked 
tags would allow any attacker to modify tag data at will, 
whilst also opening the door to a range of other misuse. One 
possible avenue of active misuse against unlocked tags would 
be to issue LockID commands and ‘permanently’ lock some 
or all of a system‘s RFID tags. As this attack is simply an 
issuance of a valid command it fits firmly in the category of 
an active misuse and could also be considered a limited form 
of DoS as future valid commands would be ignored and limit 
or cripple the functionality of a system dependent on 
operation. This paper details an experiment using the LockID 
command to lock multiple tags within range. 
Keywords: Radiofrequency Identification, RFID Tags, 
Information Security 
 
1 Introduction 
  Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) relies on 
transponders which are incorporated into an object for the 
purpose of identification or tracking [1]. The transponder (or 
tag) may be used to store information and will respond to 
signals sent by a transceiver (RFID reader) [2]. Increasingly 
such technology is being incorporated into supply chain 
management systems throughout the world and is expected to 
eventually replace traditional bar-coding systems [3].  
 
“The Electronic Product Code is an identification scheme for 
universally identifying physical objects via Radio Frequency 
Identification tags and other means” [4]. The electronic 
product code (EPC) standards were created by EPCglobal as 
an open, community based approach to promote the use of 
RFID technology in supply chain management., while not 
explicitly focused on security, the standards purport to 
promote a secure environment for RFID use and protect both 
individual and organizational privacy. 
Whilst EPC tags were primarily designed for write once / read 
many time applications they are able to be used in a variety of 
means across their four states of operation (un-programmed, 
programmed, locked and killed). These states dictate the 
behaviour of the RFID Tag when a given command is issued. 
The focus of this research was to investigate the use of the 
lock state and its related LockID command and builds upon 
previous work into directed LockID attacks. 
 
2 The LockID Command 
 According to the EPC standards [5], the LockID 
command precludes further modification of values contained 
on an RFID Tag. The command based upon a more specific 
version of the ProgramID command whereby the [PTR] value 
points to the most significant bit of the password location and 
the [Value] must be equal to 0xA5 (hex value A5). 
 
Given this command, the locking of an RFID tag may be 
achieved through the following steps: 
1. Program the KILL code and leave the lock code at 
00h; 
2. Verify the EPC code by issuing a ScrollallID or 
VerifyID command; 
3. Lock the tag by programming A5h to the Lock 
location; 
4. Check that the tag is locked by issuing a VerifyID 
command. N 
Note: If the tag is locked, the reader will receive no response 
to this command. 
 
Accordingly, once the tag has been locked it will no longer 
respond to any programming commands, including the verify 
command. This suggests that, as the tag does not respond to 
the programming command, the lock code cannot be removed 
making it permanently locked. Thus it has been suggested that 
the only way to modify the tag at all is to utilize the kill 
command with the programmed password, which will render 
the tag inactive ‘forever’ [6]. Subsequent research has 
demonstrated that resurrection after a tag has been killed is 
possible – which has the duel effect of resetting the lock but at 
a significant time cost for any significant tag volume [7]. 
 
3 The Attack 
 To date a range of attacks have been developed against 
systems utilizing this standard, but the LockID based attack 
differs as it requires no password cracking or additional 
equipment. Rather, the purpose behind this attack is to utilize 
the existing controls of the standard to circumvent the systems 
normal functionality. 
The single lock attack is based on the principle of an attacker 
selecting a single tag and locking that tag. At its base level 
this attack is no different to a legitimate user locking a single 
tag in any valid application. To test the validity of this attack a 
standard tag / reader setup was created in the Faraday cage as 
illustrated in figure 1.  
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Figure 1 – Experimental Setup 
 
The experimental setup included the use of three EPC RFID 
tags at a single time; this setup meant that a single tag from 
the selection may be targeted and locked and the other two 
may be tested to see if they remain unaltered, showing that a 
targeted attack against a single tag is viable.  As there were 
three positions that could be occupied by the tags, it was 
decided that the position of the tag to be locked would be 
rotated amongst the three positions with each group.  
 
Previous research on this targeted attack showed that the 
attack was highly effective, In essence the researcher was able 
to target a specific tag and lock the tag at will. This is 
demonstrated in figure 2. This new extension of the research 
was intended to demonstrate that such an attack would be 
highly scalable. Whilst a large variety of tag numbers were 
successfully attempted the discussion of results will be limited 
to three tag setups for the sake of visual clarity. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Single Lock Results 
 
Through experimentation it was found that their were two 
feasible methods of issuing the attack. The first would be to 
sequentially issue lock commands for every possible tag id 
within the tag space. To determine the validity of this attack a 
few simple calculations were conducted as detailed below: 
 
Tag Identifier Space = 96 bits = 296 =  
79228162514264337593543950336 
 
Assuming 100 Lock operations a second: 
 
Complete Lock Attack Time = 296 / 100 = 
220078229206289826648734 hours 
= 9169926216928742777031 days 
= 25123085525832171992 years 
 
Clearly such an attack method would be infeasible, even if a 
reader could somehow be increased tenfold to allow 1000 lock 
operations per second, the attack would still take far beyond a 
single lifetime. With this established, the second more feasible 
approach was considered whereby the reader would first 
conduct an inventory of the tags in the area of the attacking 
machine and then use the list of detected tags to issue focused 
lock commands. 
 
In figure 3 below, three tags are setup in the cage with an 
attacking transceiver set to commence operation at a specified 
interval. From the figure it is clear to see that the attacks occur 
almost in parallel. Such results were paralleled with every size 
of victim sample trialed in the study. 
  
 
Figure 3 – LockID against multiple tags 
 
Whilst either approach would constitute an active attack (i.e. 
one that requires direct interaction), it would be possible to 
integrate the collection method with an eavesdropping attack. 
Whilst such an attack may take longer to directly target all 
transponders that were contacted by legitimate users. Such 
attack blending could limit the detectability of the attack and 
reduce the likelihood of countermeasures being successfully 
created and deployed. 
4 Conclusion 
 The paper presented a small but significant extension to the 
previously documented single lock attack. The simplicity of 
this approach is that like its directed counterpart the attack 
requires nothing beyond the standard equipment. The single 
LockID research demonstrated how the command may be 
targeted to an individual tag without altering the standard 
functionality of the RFID reader. Similarly the multiple vector 
attack was shown to work without the modification of the 
attacking transceiver. 
 
Through the evidence of the multiple attacks efficacy and the 
two feasible methods of target gathering it is clear that such a 
method may be employed to attack complaint RFID systems. 
An example of this attack would be a Supermarket whereby 
the attacker could lock all tags in the store preventing prices 
(stored on the tag) from being altered. In this scenario, every 
affected transponder would need to be killed and resurrected 
to return to normal operation. Even using fairly conservative 
figures there would likely be a significant cost in time and lost 
revenue.  
 
In the standards used for this experiment, the victim would 
likely find it difficult if not impossible to defend or detect the 
attack in time to make a difference. Whilst the EPC standard 
is rapidly evolving many existing setups may be the target of 
similar attacks though their currently seems to be a lack of 
evidence for such attacks taking place within the wider 
community. This may either be due to a lack of motive in the 
attackers or the rarity of such setups. 
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